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Absent Divinity: Pindaric Mode in the Odes of Percy Bysshe Shelley 
 
The early nineteenth century saw the revival of the ode as a major subgenre 
within English lyric poetry. At the height of the Romantic movement (1798-1830), Lord 
Byron, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Keats, Percy Bysshe Shelley, William 
Wordsworth and others experimented with the ode’s usage to a degree unseen since its 
introduction into the English language. Critics have often assumed that the popularity of 
the ode among Romantic poets can be solely attributed to the laxity of structure and 
heightened emotion the form permits. Scholars who have attempted to define poetic 
modes solely through inflexible formal distinctions frequently propound this view; 
Robert Beum and Karl Shapiro’s Prosody Handbook determines that “it is difficult to say 
what an ode is. One is tempted to describe it as a poem of some length which does not 
follow any of the other conventional forms.” (Beum 128). More specifically regarding the 
Romantic period, they claim: “Ode forms are valued, not because of their classical origin, 
but because they can be employed with a certain looseness…and also felt to resemble the 
‘pulsations’ of intense feeling.” (162-163).  
Despite this condescending dismissal of any possibility of formal poetic rigor in 
the genre, the Romantics did not create the ode in a poetic vacuum and were far more 
familiar with (and made better use of) their classical antecedents than this sort of 
scholarship admits. The Romantic ode grew out of an English lyric tradition that was 
deeply attuned to the classics. In particular, the odes of Percy Bysshe Shelley are deeply 
conscious of their Pindaric origins and may be simultaneously viewed as imitations, 
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interpretations, and innovations of the form and content of their predecessors. A cursory 
examination of Shelley’s “Ode to Naples” is sufficient to determine that Shelley had 
Pindar in mind in at least one instance while writing his odes, as the form of the ode 
clearly resembles the strictly ordered Pindaric model of strophe, antistrophe, and epode. 
In his essay “Shelley’s First Pythian,” Michael Erkelenz demonstrates several clear 
formal and thematic connections between Pindar’s “Pythian 1” and Shelley’s “Ode To 
Naples.” Shelley studied Greek extensively at Oxford—one of his best-known works, 
Prometheus Unbound, was inspired by Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, and he also 
produced a translation of Euripides’ Cyclops. Shelley was already familiar with Pindar 
when he wrote his own odes, and his debt is readily apparent in “Ode To Naples.”  
Unlike virtually every other major Romantic ode, “Ode to Naples” calls clear 
attention to the structural influence of Pindar, and by extension, his thematic influence. 
However, as we will see later, Shelley’s overt departure from the traditional Pindaric 
order of stanzas suggests that he may depart in some way from Pindaric thought as well. 
Since Shelley is not content to merely reproduce the form of his predecessor, his “Ode to 
Naples” may be seen less as an imitation of Pindar than a creative response to the context 
of his thought. Shelley did not employ Pinadric ode as license for unrestrained torrents of 
emotion. Rather, his odes and other short poems of address represent a disciplined study 
of and creative response to Pindar’s work, a translation of Pindaric praxis into modern 
political, cultural, and intellectual circumstances. 
Pindaric ode’s occasional praise of the wealthy sponsors of the victorious athlete 
has often been interpreted as mere flattery, reducing the essence of Pindar’s poetry to its 
function as a political or social stabilizer that ossifies the civic order: “that function, it has 
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been determined with almost universal consent, was the maintenance and stabilization of 
a certain socio-political order—more often than not an aristocratic one” (Stocking 1). 
William Fitzgerald acknowledges that this may be the first reaction of many readers who 
consider an initiation into Pindar problematic: “Before we commit ourselves to the task 
of reading Pindar, we may well ask, ‘Why should we care about this hired praiser of 
aristocratic athletes?’” (Fitzgerald ix). According to such readings, what is most 
significant about Pindaric ode is its inherently undemocratic nature. Ode serves as a 
mouthpiece for tyranny by associating the glory of the ancient Olympic victor with the 
sovereignty of the tyrant, and its emphasis on a heroic victor who transcends the 
limitations of lesser men is unegalitarian and destructive in the context of the larger 
community. Stocking, however, argues that despite the emphasis many scholars have 
placed on Pindaric ode as a vehicle for the gathering of political authority and legitimacy, 
when viewed from the perspective of Bataille’s “general economy” (the claim that while 
we pretend the purpose of our social behaviors is to accumulate energies, we only save up 
in order to squander and expend), Pindaric ode is revealed as an instrument for a sacred 
excess that maintains true community. The encomiastic1 function of the Pindaric ode 
ultimately places the victor at the center of an intoxicating ekstasis that dissolves modern 
notions of individualism and autonomous subjectivity.  
The excessive nature of Pindaric ode is most overtly demonstrated in Pindar’s 
form and style—his tendency to pile descriptions, lists of attributes, examples, and 
                                                 
1 The Greek understanding of the encomiastic is connected to the social activity of komos, in 
which “a crowd of inebriated, wreath-crowned revelers would break forth from their private 
gathering to issue out onto the street, whence they would sing in noisy procession to the homes of 
friends and neighbors and look to gain admittance there…according to Pindar, komos ought to be 
a regular feature of victory celebration…more interestingly…Pindar also frequently describes 
victory ode itself as a komos… “(Stocking 2).   
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obscure mythological references upon each other overwhelms many readers in its 
exuberance, and his circular, strophic structure allows him to roll out torrents of 
ceaseless, self-renewing verse. Contextually, Pindar’s victory odes celebrate and protect 
the expenditure of the victor who risks his self-possession by surrendering to the athletic 
event and the divine—he becomes a vessel for sacred forces that are far beyond his 
limited autonomy. Pindar’s insistence that mortal glory is fleeting and wholly dependent 
on the goodwill of the divine is far removed from the glorification of a magnified subject 
who exploits Pindar’s poetry for his own political ends.  In defeat or failure, the athlete is 
confronted with his own calculable limitation, and the community is convinced that some 
risks are not worth taking: “there is something one must hold oneself back from” 
(Stocking 7). Out of loss, the universe is reduced to terms of loss and gain: “Money, 
money makes the man, said the man who lost all his possessions and friends!” (Pindar 
Isthimian 2). This attitude is antithetical to that of the athlete, who “places her existence 
upon grounds that one cannot finally calculate. We call this risk…” (Stocking 7), and 
according to Pindar, “great risk does not seize hold of the cowardly man” (Pindar 
Olympian 1 82). 
  But in the moment of victory, the community is confronted with an “incalculable 
other” (quoted by Stocking 7) whose achievements temporarily liberate it from the 
anxieties of finitude and temporality: “If I am no longer concerned about what will be, 
but about what is, what reason do I have to keep anything in reserve?” (ibid). In the 
moment of celebration, the victor becomes a bridge between the community and the 
sacred—we release whatever energies we have gathered, dissolving our subjectivity in 
the face of the limitless other just as the athlete has done in the face of the divine. If, as 
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Fitzgerald claims, “mortals participate in immortality by being its opposite pole” 
(Fitzgerald 3), the victorious athlete temporarily represents the middle ground. He 
represents an other that is too far beyond us to be incorporated into any one subject’s 
personal, homogenizing system.  
With the restoration of infinte possibility, we squander our energies through our 
relation to the victor. Thus, Pindar’s odes preserve the possibility of something more than 
mere preservation through the ritualization of spontaneous overflow. Once time reasserts 
itself, the moment of ecstasy fades away, and the victor and audience feel an impulse 
towards conservation. By attempting to freeze the moment of pure squandering in a sort 
of temporal stasis, the audience attempts to hold on to the positive results of excess even 
while altering its inherent spontaneity. Yet the ode remains as something outside the 
bounds of temporality, encouraging a transmission of past glory from Pindar’s time to the 
present day and protecting the possibility of expenditure against satiety. In this reading, 
Pindar’s recurrent call for moral restraint is understood as a reminder to not let oneself 
become self-satisfied, bloated, and acquisitive: “as we receive our being from the Other, 
the sacredness of the Other, we must withhold ourselves from all temptation to 
technologize the Other—to take only what we can receive; because taking implies 
calculation, objectification: all those qualities by which we lose our being-in-relation” 
(Stocking 9). To strive for more than the gods have allotted you is to objectify yourself 
and others, extinguishing the possibility of joy. Friedrich Nietzsche offers an aphorism 
directly inspired by Pindar’s Second Pythian that is relevant in this context: “You should 
become who you are” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science 152). Nietzsche’s autobiography, 
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Ecce Homo: How Becomes What One Is fulfills the promise of its title through further 
elaboration:  
That one becomes what one is presupposes that one does not 
have the remotest idea what one is…the blunders of life…the 
seriousness squandered on tasks which lie outside the task…have their 
own meaning and value. They are an expression of a great sagacity, 
even the supreme sagacity: where nosce te ipsum [know thyself] would 
be the recipe for destruction; self-forgetfulness, self-misunderstanding, 
self-dimuntion, self-narrowing, mediocratizing becomes reason itself. 
(quoted by Bishop 57). 
  
Hamilton interprets Nietzsche’s vague comprehensibility, which turns out to be precisely 
the point: “the call to become what you are suggests a resistance to the forces of reason, a 
rejection of the expropriating forces that render you comprehensible (for another) and 
therefore robbed of life” (Hamilton 62-63). Ultimately, Pindar denies our tendency 
towards self-definition or objectification by holding “us in a state of indefinite 
suspension” (Stocking 10)—when mortals are simultaneously magnified and diminished, 
everything and nothing, they are no longer subject to the limitations that are inherent in 
definition:  
“There is one race of men, one race of gods; and from a single 
mother we both draw our breath. But all allotted power divides us: man 
is nothing, but for the gods the bronze sky endures as a secure home 
forever. Nevertheless, we bear some resemblance to the immortals, 
either in greatness of mind or in nature, although we do not know, by 
day or by night, towards what goal fortune has written that we should 
run…” (Pindar Nemean 6 1-8). 
 
Here and elsewhere, Pindar’s dizzying notions of self refuse to allow humanity a 
comfortable knowledge that might lead to the feeling that we possess something stable to 
be preserved. However, Pindar’s shifts in hierarchical perspective also imply that we 
would be equally mistaken to assume that we are too insignificant have any energies to 
offer up for expenditure. We are left knowing virtually nothing about ourselves, and may 
even be tempted to view the individual as nothing—except for the fact that higher forces 
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that do not belong to the self pass through it in occasional moments of inspiration, glory, 
or victory that connect us to the gods. As Pindar famously expresses the ostensible 
paradox in the final epode of Pythian 8: “Creatures of a day! What is someone? What is 
no one? A dream of a shadow/is man. But whenever Zeus-given brightness comes,/a 
shining light rests upon men, and a gentle life (95-97).”Among a series of short poems 
loosely connected to the long love poem Epipsychidion, Shelley offers a fragment 
dedicated to an anonymous lover that alludes to the profound content of this passage. 
Shelley begins by insisting upon diminishing his object of address: “I will not, as most 
dedicators do,/Assure myself and all the world and you,/That you are faultless 
(Fragments Connected With “Epipsychidion”, 120-122)”, and ultimately asks an overtly 
Pindaric question: 
Alas! what are we? Clouds 
Driven by the wind in warring multitudes, 
Which rain into the bosom of the earth, 
And rise again, and in our death and birth, 
And through our restless life, take as from heaven                    
Hues which are not our own, but which are given, 
And then withdrawn, and with inconstant glance 
Flash from the spirit to the countenance. 
There is a Power, a Love, a Joy, a God 
Which makes in mortal hearts its brief abode,                         
A Pythian exhalation, which inspires 
Love, only love--a wind which o'er the wires 
Of the soul's giant harp 
There is a mood which language faints beneath; 
You feel it striding, as Almighty Death                               
His bloodless steed... (126-141)  
    
With this context in mind, we may begin to account for the “looseness” and 
“pulsations” Buem and Shapiro discover in the English Romantic ode—what they deem a 
limp and thoughtless excessiveness may be excessive by design if it has its roots in the 
Pindaric. In other words, since excess is a historical current that runs through the ode 
from Pindar to Shelley, what Beum and Shapiro seem to be objecting to is non-Horatian 
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ode. In fact, the modern notion that the Romantic ode can be characterized by lack of 
restraint due to its disregard of Classical antecedents derives from a common Classical 
perception of a single Classical model. The originator of the ode has historically been 
perceived as both “loose” and “pulsating” due almost entirely to Horace’s partial poetic 
account. The Roman poet’s assertions that “A poet aspiring to write Pindarically/Needs 
wings of wax such as Daedalus made” (Horace IV.2 1-2) and “Pindar, like a rapid 
mountain stream/ Bursting its banks after torrential rain,/Boiling, seething, rushes on full 
steam/ Ahead” (5-8) “did much to establish Pindar’s reputation for lawless, irrational 
impetuosity. At the same time, Horace’s more meditative and inward-looking odes 
offered an alternative model” (Erkelenz 407). Regarding the historical conception of 
Pindar, Fitzgerald writes: “Pindar has been seen as the inspired but wanton genius par 
excellence…As the ancient precedent for a poetry dictated by inspiration rather than 
rules, he has…provided the modern poet with a model and authority for breaking the 
‘classical’ mold” (Fitzgerald ix).  
Later, Fitzgerald calls attention to what he terms “a distinct paradox (139)”—“the 
Pindaric has traditionally been regarded as the appropriate form in which to celebrate 
formal occasions” yet “the Pindaric has been seen as the type of the irregular, lawless 
poem (ibid).” Despite this, Fitzgerald argues that “the metrical pattern and the formalized 
dance that traditionally accompanied it [Pindaric ode] celebrate the closed order [the 
Apollonian] to which Pindar appeals at the beginning of Pythian 1 (ibid).” Some 
historical literary figures emphasized Pindar’s rigorous formality—the Restoration 
playwright and poet William Congreve famously declared that “there is nothing more 
regular than the odes of Pindar”—but such opinions were the exception, not the rule. In 
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pre-Romantic England, the alleged distinction between the Pindaric and the Horatian was 
widely accepted by the educated classes. Because he wrote in Latin, Horace’s odes were 
considered canonical and formally standard, but Abraham Cowley’s imitations and loose 
translations of Pindaric ode provided the most direct access to Pindar for those who did 
not read Ancient Greek.   
The institution of the ode as a major form in English lyric poetry came relatively 
late, but its contemporaneous innovators established a Pindaric and a Horatian model 
simultaneously. “In 1629 both the acknowledged reigning monarch of English poetry and 
his then obscure heir apparent—Ben Jonson and John Milton—composed masterpieces in 
the form” (Curran 64). While Milton’s “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity” reveals the 
influence of Horace, Jonson’s “To the Immortal Memory and Friendship of That Noble 
Pair, Sir Lucius Cary and Sir H. Morison” is explicitly Pindaric. By dedicating his ode to 
a pair of friends, one dead and one living, Jonson recalls the myth of the stellified Gemini 
twins Kastor and Polydeukes, a subject Pindar thoroughly explores in Nemean 10. 
Jonson’s ode demonstrates a deep appreciation of and insight into Pindaric thought. For 
example, “in a remarkably dense wordplay, Johnson refers to Cary and Morison as ‘these 
twi-/Lights, the Dioscuri” (92-93); the separated prefix, twi-, makes the lights both bright 
(double, twin) and obscure (twilight), and the word twilight is played against the 
translingually parallel Di-oscuri (double-dark), once again linking light and dark” 
(Fitzgerald 5). To Fitzgerald, this implies that Jonson was conscious of Pindar’s method 
in Nemean 10 (and indeed all of his victory odes). For Pindar and Jonson, “the Dioscuri 
represent the divided status of agonistic man in the precarious moment when the human 
touches the divine” (4-5).      
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Ultimately, a tension in the English conception of the ode developed from the 
divergence between the ruminative, personal, and moralistic Horatian or Miltonic style 
and Cowley’s vigorous but purposefully obscure adaptations of Pindaric ode. Unlike 
Jonson, Cowley decided against replicating Pindaric structure in his “Pindarique” 
imitations.  Influenced by Horace’s warnings that a poet who imitates the father of the 
ode is sure to resemble Icarus in flying too close to the sun, he declared that “If a man 
should undertake to translate Pindar word for word, it would be thought that one mad 
man had translated another” (quoted by Hamilton 177). John T. Hamilton associates the 
“threat of madness with the threat of losing one’s authorial voice” and claims “Cowley’s 
method is essentially a way of giving Pindar back his voice. Literalism…would have de-
Pindarized Pindar” (ibid). Cowley’s imitation of Horace’s ode on Pindar, “The Praise of 
Pindar,” provides a summary of the argument: “Pindar is imitable by none;/The Pheonix 
Pindar is a vast Species alone./Who e’re but Daedalus with waxen wings could fly/And 
neither sink too low, nor soar too high?/What could he who follow’d claim,/But of vain 
boldness unhappy fame,/And by his fall a Sea to name?” (quoted by Hamilton 175).  
However, the lack of restrictions Cowley placed upon English versions of 
Pindaric ode led to a widespread assumption that Horace was correct in his assessment: 
Pindaric odes lacked coherent form, and “whatever in matter and style Horace was 
not…the Cowleyan Pindarick came to be” (Curran 65). According to Curran, the English 
ode began to blend the “solitary voice” of the Horatian speaker with “the Pindaric reach 
for the infinite (ibid).” This amalgamation of sources and styles was developed by pre-
Romantics like Thomas Gray and William Collins and inherited by the Romantic 
generation. One critic claims “the point in British literary history when the sense of the 
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traditional uses and conventions of the ode coalesces…is the late eighteenth century. The 
Romantic ode owes much of its greatness to its bearing the burden of that collective 
history.” (Curran 63). Nowhere is this demonstrated so clearly as in Shelley’s odes. 
Like Pindaric ode, Shelley’s odes investigate the possibility that humanity can be 
opened up to expenditure in the face of the sacred. The fundamental experience for the 
reader of his odes is one of excess. Shelley consistently utilizes the Pindaric techniques of 
overwhelming the reader with obscure allusions, uncertain or constantly shifting 
significance, and poetic sentences or ideas that are so prolonged or complex the reader 
often loses track of the vertiginous progression of the thought. The obscurity and 
difficulty of Shelley’s verse recalls Voltaire’s comic apostrophe to Pindar: “You who 
skillfully modulate/Verses that no one understands/And that must always be admired” 
(quoted by Hamilton 2). For example, the first stanza of “Ode to the West Wind” (“O 
wild West Wind, thou breath of Autumn’s being” (Shelley, Ode to the West Wind 1)) is 
composed of fourteen lines but only one sentence. While the sentence’s subject (the West 
Wind) is supplied immediately, the reader must hold Shelley’s stream of descriptive 
digressions in a sort of stasis until the conclusion of the stanza, which finally provides an 
imperative verb that relates back to the subject: “hear, O hear!” (14). Yet while “Ode to 
the West Wind” provides an excellent example of Shelley’s Pindaric excess and 
obscurity, Shelley’s “Ode to Naples” may demonstrate the most overt connection to 
Pindaric form, style, and content of any of his works.  
In his essay “Shelley’s First Pythian,” Michael Erkelenz discovers a series of 
clear connections between “Ode to Naples” and Pindar’s Pythian 1 and comes to the 
conclusion that Shelley’s ode functions as a recalling of or creative response to Pindar. In 
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doing so, Erkelenz describes “Ode to Naples” as “a product of…Romantic Hellenism: an 
empirically based ‘rediscovery of Greece’…which since the Rennaisance had been seen 
primarily through Roman eyes” (Erkelenz 407). Indeed, while many of Shelley’s 
Romantic contemporaries pursued a Horatian model when composing their odes, the 
“Ode to Naples” is written according to a Pindaric model: “it is public, politically topical, 
and encomiastic.” (Erkelenz 407-408). Due to these qualities, Shelley’s odes posit a 
relationship between humanity and the divine that is absent in many of the private and 
individual (Horatian) odes of his era.        
Erkelenz argues that “‘Pythian 1’ stands out among Pindar’s odes for the special 
emphasis it places on celebrating a city. Although Hieron’s victory in the Pythian chariot 
race…is the immediate occasion of the ode, this victory has significance…only in 
relation to Hieron’s founding of Aitna six years earlier” (Erkelenz 395). In protecting 
Aitna from the tyranny of the Phoenicians and Etruscans, Hieron overcomes external 
threats to his people’s freedom;2 in establishing “divinely fashioned freedom under the 
laws of Hyllos’ rule” (Pindar, Pythian 1 61-62) he ensures his city’s internal stability. 
Within this context, the victory of a chariot team sponsored by Hieron can be understood 
less as an athletic event and more as a favorable omen for Aitna, which requires the 
goodwill of the gods to endure at the base of the active volcano Mount Aetna. In Pindar’s 
ode, the infamous “Typhos the hundred-headed” (16) is imprisoned by the gods within 
Aetna, “from whose depths belch forth holiest springs of unapproachable fire; during the 
days rivers of lava pour forth a blazing stream of smoke, but in times of darkness a 
rolling red flame carries rocks into the deep expanse of the sea with a crash…” (21-24). 
                                                 
2
 Hieron “cast their [the enemy’s] youth from their swiftly sailing ships into the sea and delivered 
Hellas from grievous slavery”(Pindar 74-75). 
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Hieron may triumph over his external enemies in a political context, but his colony is 
helpless against such a monster without the blessing of the divine. The ultimate effect of 
“Pythian 1” is to remind its audience that mortal power is fleeting, and that whatever 
glory we may personally win is not truly our own: “For from the gods come all the means 
for human achievements” (41).  
The great Hieron is ultimately compared to the famous archer Philoktetes, who 
was bitten by a poisonous snake and was abandoned to suffer on a remote island by the 
Greek armies attacking Troy due to the stench of his rotting wounds. When his comrades 
finally retrieved him because of a prophecy that claimed Troy would fall to his bow, he 
“destroyed Priam’s city and ended the Danaans’ toils; he walked with flesh infirm, but it 
was the work of destiny…” (54-55). Throughout his odes, Pindar insists that we confront 
the fact that there are forces far greater than the political—Hieron will temporarily 
overcome mortal contingencies, but only through the blessing of the insurmountable and 
the uncontrollable—even in his victory success does not belong to him alone. If Hieron 
recalls Philoktetes in his glory, he also recalls him in his mortality and relative weakness. 
The point more broadly concerns humanity as a whole—we all walk with flesh infirm, 
and our triumphs are the work of destiny. This understanding of mortal accomplishments 
is applied to both political and athletic achievements. 
Just as Pindar treats the “terrible springs” (Pythian 1 25) of Aitna as a looming, 
potentially catastrophic presence throughout his ode, Shelley begins his celebration of 
Naples’ newfound political freedom3 with a somber recollection of standing alone in the 
ruins of volcanic Pompeii: “I stood within the city disinterred;/And heard the autumnal 
                                                 
3 Shelley wrote “Ode To Naples” after a popular uprising led to the temporary formation of a 
constitutional monarchy.   
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leaves like light footfalls/Of spirits passing through the streets; and heard/The Mountain’s 
slumberous voice at intervals/Thrill through those roofless halls...” (Ode to Naples 1-5).  
The sense of danger lurking dormant beneath the surface of things in both Shelley and 
Pindar serves as a warning to rulers or nations that might prove ungrateful and therefore 
unworthy of the blessings they have received: “The alternating sounds of the ‘autumnal 
leaves’ and the ‘mountain’s slumberous voice’ bring to mind the great catastrophe of the 
past and portend the possibility of an equally great catastrophe to come” (Erkelenz 403). 
Yet while the uncontestable force of a destructive natural world looms over Aitna and 
Naples, Shelley and Pindar do not ignore the prospect of foreign invasion. While 
Hieron’s Aitna is in constant danger of barbarian invasion, Erkelenz notes that 
historically, “the viability of the new order at Naples was even more doubtful than that of 
the new order at Aitna.” (402). In his reading, the monarchical Austrian “Anarchs of the 
North” (Ode to Naples 137) are equated to the northern barbarians who plagued ancient 
Greece. Unfortunately for Naples, these modern barbarians wield political influence and 
military power. Their potential devastation of Naples is illustrated with volcanic imagery, 
conflating blood with fire and political opposition with the potential hostility of the 
natural and the divine: “They come; the fields they tread look black and hoary/With 
fire—from their red feet the streams run gory” (147-148).  
While Shelley is sometimes described as a purely political poet due to his 
controversial opinions, tumultuous personal life, and many shorter poems condemning 
tyranny, monarchy, and injustice, Shelley’s odes, like Pindar’s, do not treat political 
reform as an end in itself. “Ode To Naples” is clearly, among other things, a work of 
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propaganda targeting British public opinion. As Erkelenz notes, its most overt contextual 
connection to Pindar’s Pythian 1 lies in the fact that:  
“The ‘Ode to Naples’ follows Pindar in celebrating the 
achievements of a city under threat. Like the city...Hieron had founded 
on the slopes of Aetna, Naples had recently undergone a political 
reconstitution… Yet…Naples also remained subject to the very forces 
of chaos it had banished. As internal dissension and barbarian invasion 
threatened Aitna, Austria and absolutism threatened Naples. Typhos 
had been bound, not destroyed” (Erkelenz 394). 
      
Yet the contemporary appeal of “Ode to Naples” lies in its artistic merit, not its value as a 
document expressing one reaction to a particular historical event. To read Shelley’s ode 
as exclusively political because it celebrates an idealized polis seems to be a superficial 
interpretation that ignores the higher forces that make political freedom possible within 
the context of the ode. Like Pindar, Shelley makes clear distinctions (perhaps most 
notably in “Mont Blanc” 4) between earthly, political power and inscrutable, transcendent 
Power, contrasting the tyrannical Italian city-states ruled “by power” (Shelley, Ode to 
Naples 121) with a silence that “weighed on their [leaves’] life; even as the Power 
divine/Which then lulled all things, brooded upon mine” (21-22). Even within the overtly 
political “Ode To Naples,” Shelley ultimately views political reform as a necessary step 
for approaching “man’s high hope and unextinct desire,/The instrument to work thy [the 
Spirit of Beauty’s] will divine!” (168-169). Both Shelley and Pindar believe that justice 
and political freedom are desirable, but ultimately only worthwhile insofar as they allow 
the possibility of joyous celebration or beauty—forces that justify the utility of the 
political through their existence as something beyond it. This is reminiscent of Georges 
                                                 
4 Compare “Frost and the Sun in scorn of mortal power/Have piled: dome, pyramid, and 
pinnacle,/A city of death” (103-105) to the Ravine of Arve, an “awful scene/Where Power in 
likeness of the Arve comes down/From the ice gulphs that gird his secret throne” (15-17). As in 
“Ode to Naples”, the capitalization or lack thereof renders Shelley’s distinction relatively 
unambiguous.  
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Bataille’s notion of equality and justice in The Accursed Share: ”Without having 
anything against justice…one may be allowed to point out that here the word conceals the 
profound truth of its contrary, which is precisely freedom…” (Bataille, The Accursed 
Share 38). Bataille’s freedom is not a freedom from negative forces like tyranny, but a 
freedom to celebration and expenditure. Justice fails as soon as it limits the potential for a 
joyous excess that may seem illogical from the perspective of the forces of conservation. 
The theme of music (and by extension, lyric poetry) as a harmonizing force of 
justice is a further point of comparison between Shelley and Pindar’s odes. Pindar begins 
his ode with a tribute to the melodies of Apollo’s “Golden Lyre” (Pythian 1, 1), which 
have the power to “quench even the warring thunderbolt of ever flowing fire” (5-6). By 
letting the sacred energies given by Apollo issue back into the world through the medium 
of the lyre or the lyric, the musician and the poet fulfill their position within a divine 
circuitry so well that even the gods are sated: “powerful Ares puts aside his sharp-pointed 
spears and delights his heart in sleep” (10-12).  
Shelley’s treatment of music in “Ode to Naples” is extremely complex, as 
virtually every stanza of his ode investigates a different aspect of the relationship 
between music and dissonance, sound and silence. Sailing on the Bay of Naples, Shelley 
feels the unseen and unheard presence of “A spirit of deep emotion/From the unknown 
graves/Of the dead kings of Melody” (37-39). The enemies of Naples are portrayed 
through the menacing cacophony of their advance, as “Dissonant threats kill Silence far 
away” (134): “Hear ye the march as of the Earth-born Forms/Arrayed against the ever-
living Gods?/The crash and darkness of a thousand storms/Bursting their inaccessible 
abodes/Of crags and thunder-clouds?” (127-131). Such dissonance is juxtaposed with the 
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infectious and democratizing music of political rebellion which inspired Naples: “Didst 
thou not start to hear Spain’s thrilling paean/From land to land re-echoed solemnly,/Till 
silence became music?” (102-104).  
Yet even this positive portrayal of earthly music seems insignificant when 
compared to a toneless divine “voice” that goes as far beyond music in its capacity to 
express incommunicable emotion as music goes beyond language5: “The oracular thunder 
penetrating shook/The listening soul in my suspended blood;/I felt that Earth out of her 
deep heart spoke--/I felt, but heard not…” (6-9). Here, the “Mountain’s slumberous 
voice” (5) is reminiscent of the voice of the titular mountain in “Mont Blanc”: “Thou hast 
a voice, great Mountain, to repeal/Large codes of fraud and woe; not understood/By all, 
but which the wise, and great, and good/Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel” (Mont 
Blanc 80-83). One difference between these two passages is the “slumberous” nature of 
Vesuvius’ voice, which may be a reference to the sleeping Ares and dormant Typhos in 
Pindar. This suggests that, from a mortal perspective, the revelations of the “oracular 
thunder” may not impart purely benevolent knowledge—the “deep heart” of Earth is the 
home of Typhos, and the wisdom it reveals through its “oracular thunder” is the terrifying 
truth of man’s insignificance with the natural and supernatural order.  
While Pindaric music springs from a single sacred source, the sounds of Shelley’s 
ode are so diverse in origin that their underlying cause appears to be absent or 
indefinable. In this way, the poet finds that his own voice is ecstatically overwhelmed by 
a prophetic force speaking through him that he can neither comprehend nor identify: 
“Louder and louder, gathering round, there wandered/Over the oracular woods and divine 
                                                 
5 See one of Shelley’s many fragments entitled “To ----”: “Music, when soft voices die,/Vibrates 
in the memory.” (CITE) 
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sea/Prophesyings which grew articulate--/They seize me—I must speak them!—be they 
fate!” (Ode to Naples 47-50). This gesture seems to mark the end of the stagnation and 
personal focus of the ode’s two introductory epodes, allowing the poem to blossom into a 
distinctly Pindaric celebration of a city and its political victory.  
However, a close reading of “Ode to Naples” also highlights clear differences 
between Pindar and Shelley. Although “Ode to Naples” can be understood as a modern 
imitation and interpretation of “Pythian 1” due to the poems’ similarities of theme and 
tone, Shelley’s formal imitations of and deviations from Pindar are also worth 
considering. While Shelley utilizes Pindaric form, he does not mindlessly reproduce it. 
Instead, Shelley borrows the traditional structure of the Pindaric ode—strophe followed 
by antistrophe followed by epode, or in Ben Jonson’s translation of the terms into 
English, turn, counter-turn, and stand—and reshapes it in peculiar ways. In a radical 
alteration of traditional structure, Shelley begins his ode with two epodes (typically the 
conclusion or “standing point” of the ode) that describe the motionless, stifling, and 
divinely inhuman silence of the ruins of Pompeii reanimated by an invigorating wind. 
From this rejuvenation of what seemed stagnant, Naples blossoms in two subsequent 
strophes: “Naples! thou Heart of men which ever pantest/Naked, beneath the lidless eye 
of Heaven!” (51-52). These strophes are immediately followed by four antistrophes that 
compare the unbound Naples to enemy nations that are still ruled by tyrants and urge the 
reader (or some greater unseen power) to “Strip every impious gawd, rend/Error veil by 
veil”(92-93). Shelley then concludes his ode with two more epodes. The first depicts 
Naples’ enemies on the march and seems to summarize the development of Shelley’s 
antistrophes, bringing them to a logical conclusion; the second serves as an even more 
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extravagant exaltation of the city than his strophes. Erkelenz suggests that the poem’s 
final stanza, with its invocation of the “Spirit of Beauty” (155) and his “harmonizing 
ardours” (165) “addresses a hymn to Apollo, calling upon the god to bring his powers to 
the aid of the constitutionalists” (Erkelenz 405).   
The use of such an elaborate form serves several purposes for Shelley. Its cyclical 
structure goes beyond the conventional repetition of rhyme and meter, both in terms of 
the reiteration of its tripartite pattern and its return to its original point through 
antistrophe, and is appropriate for a poem that takes the rebirth of a city (and the 
possibility that an antagonistic power will raze it once again) as its subject. Regarding the 
cyclical nature of Pindaric ode, Beum and Shapiro observe that “The Greek chorus 
chanted the strophe as they moved across the stage, the antistrophe as they returned to 
their original position, and the epode as they then stood in the original position” (Beum 
129). As we will see, Shelley would experiment further with the significance of cyclical 
form by employing Dante’s terza rima in his “Ode to the West Wind.” Also, unlike 
virtually every other major Romantic ode, “Ode to Naples” calls clear attention to the 
structural influence of Pindar, and by extension, his thematic influence. Similarly, 
Shelley’s departure from the traditional Pindaric order of stanzas suggests that he may 
partially depart from Pindaric thought as well. One obvious contrast between Pindar and 
Shelley is that Shelley’s odes are not addressed to athletic victors. This may lead us to 
ask the difficult question of what, if anything, defines Shelley’s objects of apostrophe.   
A close investigation of Shelley’s “Ode to the West Wind” may help elucidate 
some of the central differences between Shelley and Pindar’s modes of address. Although 
Shelley does not utilize Pindaric form in “Ode to the West Wind,” he makes the unusual 
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decision to employ the terza rima rhyme scheme, a device he adopted from Dante. The 
terza rima separates the larger stanzas that serve as sections of the poem into smaller 
units of three lines. Within these tercets, only the first and third lines end in a connected 
rhyme, but the last sound of the second line is only temporarily forgotten, as it is 
reencountered as the dominant rhyme of the next group of lines. This introduces the 
concepts of fluidity and interconnectedness into the structure of the poem, since no tercet 
can be fully appreciated or understood on its own. Because everything in “Ode to the 
West Wind” is dependent upon what surrounds it, it is difficult to determine where a 
thought begins or ends, suspending the reader in a state of perpetual motion. Each new 
rhyme sound is established as something fallow, insignificant, singular, and interior in 
one tercet before emerging as the dominant sound of the subsequent tercet. In this way, 
the organization of the terza rima contains the idea of something becoming excessive 
through a rebirth—larger or more significant than it was before. Yet just as a rhyme 
sound seems to blossom, it withers away, never to return.   
 This formal quality of “Ode to the West Wind” could not be more appropriate, as 
it is precisely this sort of internal struggle that the speaker of the poem embodies in his 
attempts to achieve the transcendental freedom of the wind, his inevitable failures, and 
his determination to continue striving for an ideal he may never reach. Like the terza 
rima, the West Wind is a force of motion and resuscitation—an  “unseen presence” (Ode 
to the West Wind 2) that nonetheless is indisputably the active agent in the poem, the 
“Destroyer and preserver” (14) that promotes natural rebirth by blowing away the dead 
and stimulating the new. Given that the wind is the embodiment of such power, it makes 
perfect sense that the speaker of “Ode to the West Wind” (who first refers to himself in 
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the fourth stanza, once the wind’s powers are established) would strive towards a 
harmonious union with the wind, just as the Pindaric victor is temporarily united with the 
divine. Indeed, the temporal element of “Ode to the West Wind” is the ultimate source of 
the gap between the poem’s subject and object, which are suspended in a strangely 
unstable equipoise that vacillates between equivalence and hierarchy.  
Through the epic and exhausting experience of the first three stanzas, the wind is 
revealed as a force that transcends time. The accumulation of the wind’s attributes in the 
first three stanzas of the ode renders the wind infinite and incalculable. The ode’s speaker 
recognizes that he is nothing in comparison to the wind, and therefore seeks to imitate the 
natural objects the wind overwhelms, controls, and destroys: “If I were a dead leaf thou 
mightest bear;/If I were a swift cloud to fly with thee;/A wave to pant beneath thy power, 
and share/The impulse of thy strength…” (43-46). By acknowledging his own 
insignificance, the speaker hopes he will become significant through sharing “the impulse 
of thy strength.” In one of the ode’s most striking images, the speaker ultimately demands 
that the wind “Make me thy lyre, even as the forest is:/What if my leaves are falling like 
its own!/The tumult of thy mighty harmonies/Will take from both a deep, autumnal 
tone,/Sweet though in sadness…” (57-61). In other words, the speaker wants to serve as a 
instrument that can give voice to the wind’s majesty—even if the process of being played 
breaks the instrument, shedding the leaves (life) of the subject, the music that is made 
possible by this breaking will be more divine, joyous, and beautiful than anything the 
subject could have composed on his own. In the moment of encounter with the 
incalculable other, the subject loses his anxiety for the future and allows himself to be 
consumed and squandered (“what if my leaves are falling?”).  
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It is this feeling of ecstasy and dissolution that creates the “deep, autumnal tone” 
that renders the melody so “sweet” in its “sadness.” Mortal nothingness turns out to be as 
beautiful as anything eternal through the momentary gleam of its consumption; death is 
now understood as a Bataillean technology that opens up the waste of time. In the 
narrative present of “Ode to the West Wind,” the time when the subject could associate 
himself with the wind has passed, just as the glory of the athlete is proven to be fleeting 
with the reassertion of temporality: “If even/I were as in my boyhood, and could be/The 
comrade of thy wanderings/Over heaven, when to outstrip thy skiey speed/Scarce seemed 
a vision…” (47-51). There was once an idealized time when time seemed infinite and the 
speaker seemed lifted beyond his limitations and contingencies through his connection to 
the transcendent.  
Yet the inevitable imposition of temporal horizontality wrecks the vertical reach 
towards a higher power. Writing on Pindaric ode, William Fitzgerald claims that “Like 
the poet’s, the victor’s moment of vertical glory is inscribed in a horizontal tradition that 
streches back into the mythical past” (Fitzgerald 53). Something similar occurs in “Ode 
to the West Wind,” as Shelley maintains a recurring shift between a rising that strives to 
render the subject equivalent to the infinite and a falling that drops us back to a grounded 
mortality: “O! lift me as a wave, a leaf, a cloud!/I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed!/A 
heavy weight of hours has chained and bowed/One too like thee: tameless, and swift, and 
proud…” (Ode to the West Wind 53-56, my emphasis). Here, the narrator desires nothing 
less than total freedom of motion—he begs to be lifted to the transcendental heights the 
wind represents, but is rendered earthbound by the material and temporal anxieties he 
cannot escape. This is reinforced by the fact that the lines regarding “the heavy weight of 
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hours” make up the closing couplet of the fourth stanza, formally closing off the 
potentiality promised by the terza rima. Thus, both the structure and the language of the 
couplet cast doubt on the possibility that the speaker will ever be able to achieve unity 
with the higher principle the wind represents. For humanity, time is the force that induces 
anxiety due to its myriad unpredictability, which necessitates calculations for the future 
that will shrink the individual in his or her attempt to shrink the world; and its singular 
predictability—it will inevitably kill the individual.  
Yet from the overarching perspective of the West Wind, time is regenerative. A 
germinating seed may appear dead, “like a corpse within its grave” (8), but it carries 
“living hues and odors” (12) within it that merely await the passage of time, which brings 
the force (“Thine azure sister of the Spring” (9)) that can continue the cyclical process of 
rebirth.  While seeds represent potentiality, (like the inactive line of the terza rima) they 
are incapable of voluntary motion and require the autumn wind to act for them, 
transporting them “to their dark wintry bed”. (6) Consequently, the wind becomes the 
impetus for the continuation of earthly life through its deathless activity. Unlike Pindar, 
the object of address in Shelley’s odes is not a human attaining a heightened status 
through komos, but a mysterious, heightened presence that the human voice of the 
speaker tries and ultimately fails to approach.  For mortals, there can be no apotheosis—a 
strophic rise is always accompanied by a parallel antistrophic sinking. Ultimately, the 
experience of reading Shelley’s odes mirrors the struggle of the subject of “Ode to the 
West Wind,” who tries but fails to fully comprehend the transcendent object of address. 
From the reader’s perspective, the ode is an object of potential knowledge that promises 
to unveil its profound secrets. Yet while the ode lifts the reader through the elevated 
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language of its verse, the reader sinks after his or her inevitable failure to penetrate its 
obscurity. 
The characterization of the wind as an unreachable ideal that can never be fully 
understood but indisputably exists is reminiscent of the Transcendental quest for the 
ultimate truth of the “thing in itself,” the abstract explanation for the idea that while 
human understanding can never be free of its own limited perspective, there is a “reality” 
inherent in each object that remains beyond our knowledge. However, the dizzying shifts 
between subject and object that characterize “Ode to the West Wind” ultimately follow a 
Pindaric model by extending the impossibility of knowledge to the self. Speaking 
specifically about English ode, Hamilton argues: “As the most intense expression of 
subjectivity, lyric effects a turn inward that not only renders objective knowledge 
questionable, but also comes to split apart the thinking subject” (Hamilton 173). In 
Pindar, the exploration of the nature of subjectivity through an exposure of its limitations 
is achieved from an external perspective, as Pindar’s narrative voice seems to have 
already internalized its lessons. But in Shelley’s odes, the speaker’s subjective, personal 
attempt to overcome the inherent difficulties of subjectivity becomes the tension that 
drives the movement of the poem. “Ode to the West Wind” strives to blend a unity with 
the sacred that transcends temporality with an all too human fear of time. The 
discrepancy between these two impulses engenders the poem’s cyclical structure, which 
may be characterized by an attempted rise, an unavoidable fall, and a new approach that 
re-initiates the process. In Shelley’s odes, it is the subject, not the object of address, 
which strives for a divinity he cannot embody. Therefore, the subject’s natural object of 
address is a divine, inscrutable, and incalculable other.  
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Unlike Pindar, whose odes promise that humanity in its diversity of aspect may 
channel various manifestations of the divine, Shelley has inherited a monotheistic world 
where the divine is singular and coincident with reality, rendering it an alienating and 
inescapable system. His project repudiates the philosophical foundations of Christianity 
that modified the classical conception of the universe. Although the ancient Greek gods 
embody particular known principles, the fact that they are indistinguishable from humans 
introduces an element of unpredictability to their actions. In contrast to this, Shelley 
views the Christian god—who is defined by set principles of law and order—as a major 
source of objectification in the world. The intricate hierarchical structure emanating from 
a heavenly form of forms that characterizes Neoplatonism is terrifying from Shelley’s 
perspective because it accounts for every variable, positing nothing beyond a knowable 
and rational reality. For Shelley, the predetermined result of traditional monotheistic 
notions of providence is that the joy that springs from a connection to incalculable 
external forces is lost in the modern world.  
Strangely, this seems to align Shelley’s metaphysical position with that of the 
father of Nominalism, the medieval thinker William of Ockham. Nominalism ruined the 
harmonious unity of Neoplatonism through its insistence that any system that seeks to 
define the sacred or limit its capacity for action even through divine laws is an insult to 
an infinite and unknowable God, who is “no longer seen as the craftsman who models the 
world on a rational plan, but as an omnipotent poet whose mystically creative freedom 
foams forth an endless variety of absolutely individual beings” (Gillespie 53, my 
emphasis). To Ockham, there are no hierarchical “forms” or “categories,” because God 
perceives the radical variety of everything beneath him. There are only discrete 
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individuals in a personal relationship with a dark power they cannot approach. Shelley’s 
embrace of transcendence seems to preserve this particular personal relationship with the 
sacred, as well as maintaining the aspects “infinite” and “unknowable” even while 
removing the God they refer to. While Ockham proposes an absent center that cannot be 
comprehended, Shelley, as we will discover, proposes an absent center that is simply not 
there.  
In the age of science, Rationalism, and Enlightenment, however, philosophers 
return to the notion that humanity has the capacity to fundamentally know and perfect the 
universe in its totality. Gillespie argues that Rene Descartes’ famous “evil demon” who is 
able to reshape time and convince mortals of any deceit he imagines is none other than 
Ockham’s God, who will not permit absolute truth to be known. Yet Descartes believes 
that while humanity cannot equal God in power and scope, each individual has the 
capacity to doubt through a refuting, negative will that is theoretically equal to God’s—
God may annihilate us, but he cannot compel obedience without our permission. For 
Descartes, this leads to a problem that Shelley may have embraced: “A purely negative 
will is independent, but it is also ignorant not merely of the world but of its own 
existence…The will’s freedom through doubt is the freedom of the void” (45).  In this 
way, Descartes’ foundational epistemological principle—Ego cogito ergo sum, I think 
therefore I am—may be understood as a solution; “the basis for universal science with 
which he [Descartes] seeks to win back the earth for man by dethroning this arbitrary and 
irrational God and making man the master and possessor of nature” (36). For Shelley and 
the Romantics, the aim of such a philosophy is the final perversion of the sacred and the 
exact opposite of the divinity of Pindaric ode—a God “turned to human use” (57). 
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Shelley’s position seems opposed to many of Descartes’ intellectual contemporaries—
perhaps most significantly, the system of Baruch Spinoza, who posits a wholly immanent 
God that can be approached through the close scientific study of nature and the objective 
world, since he is one with the “fixed and immutable order of things.” 
While this background may provide much of the grounding for Shelley’s thought, 
the radical political emphasis he clearly does not share with Pindar may be explained by 
many of the general social and historical developments of his time, which reflect 
Descartes’ quest for the mastery of nature. The increasingly prevalent trend of 
industrialization removed the urban worker from a direct relationship from nature, 
creating better-organized systems of economic inequality. The transition from an agrarian 
economy determined by the movement of the sun to an urban economy where time could 
be commodified and sold in units had been underway for centuries, but the early 
nineteenth century accelerated this movement to an unprecedented degree. Following 
Descartes’ model, the Age of Enlightenment valorized science as a tool for the discovery 
of pure, absolute, and universal knowledge. Also, as Michel Foucault claims in his study 
on the origins of the modern prison system, Discipline and Punish, new and less overtly 
coercive methods of discipline such as the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon 
allowed each prisoner (and ultimately each member of society) to be surveyed as an 
individual. This led to an order in which newly autonomous individuals self-monitored 
their own behavior, rendering them “docile and knowable” (Foucault 172).          
Shelley’s perspective on such an oppressive social situation was not unique in its 
time. Reacting to the social, economic, and political conditions of industrial England, 
William Blake’s “London” serves as a damning portrayal of an urban world that has been 
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ordered beyond repair. In the first lines of the poem, the narrator describes a journey 
taken through the city: “I wander thro’ each charter’d street,/Near where the charter’d 
Thames does flow/And mark in every face I meet/Marks of weakness, marks of woe” (1-
4). The word “charter’d” contains several possible meanings. It might imply that the 
streets and river have been given liberty or independence by a political charter, but it also 
implies that they have been mapped and bound, or that they have been privatized by the 
crown. Taken together, these connotations suggest that the allegedly liberated objects of 
the poem have been ironically incorporated into a systemized order of things, and, to 
stretch the point, that it will be claimed by the forces of order that this subjugation is in 
fact a sort of freedom (perhaps the freedom of personal profit and the free market, or the 
illusion of free will). Predictably, such liberty only applies to those who remain within 
the strict confines of the system—streets may provide freedom of motion, but they are 
also clear limitations that define where the wandering narrator can and cannot go. Each 
face the narrator meets might believe that London is successfully operated through the 
actualization of each individual’s free will, but since their actions are predictable and 
limited, their “free will” renders them cogs in a machine. They are “marked” or defined 
as individuals through their collective “weakness” and “woe,” and (in Bataillean terms) 
their poverty provides them with an excellent reason for anxiety regarding the future. 
However, the chartering of the Thames may be equally disturbing, since a river 
(throughout the development of both the classical ode and English Romanticism) is a 
natural force associated with an uncontrollable and generous excess that sustains life. To 
charter a river is to regulate its excess and therefore ensure that its “flow” does not spill 
over, containing it within its set demarcations as neatly as a system of chartered streets 
 29 
contains its flow of chartered people. Interestingly, the incessant repetition found 
throughout this stanza calls attention to the poem itself as something ordered and bound 
through the highly formal restriction of language marked on a page. But the ambiguity 
introduced by these repetitions (which often highlight startling alternative definitions of 
words like “chartered” and “mark”) also serves to break these words out of the merely 
utilitarian order that the content of the poem subverts. 
The rejection of the myth of a self-sustaining, perfectly ordered system 
maintained by an all-encompassing God becomes central to Shelley’s work and may be 
found in different forms throughout the poetry of his contemporaries. In the modern 
world, athletic victories can no longer instantiate joy or expenditure, because no victory 
can provide even a temporary ecstatic liberation from the objectified world. Only the 
absence of myth or a clearly present center (demonstrated by Shelley’s atheism) leaves 
room for true intimacy. In Bataille’s thought, “The absence of God is no longer a closure: 
it is the opening up to the infinite. The absence of God is greater, and more divine, than 
God (in the process I am no longer myself, but an absence of self; I await the sleight of 
hand that renders me immeasurably joyful)” (Bataille, The Absence of Myth 48). Bataille 
elaborates, positing a truly divine beauty in the death of myth just as Shelley’s speaker 
achieves a divine beauty (a “deep, autumnal tone”) through consumption: “today, 
because a myth is dead or dying, we see through it more easily than if it were alive: it is 
the need that perfects the transparency, the suffering which makes the suffering become 
joyful…the absence of myth is also a myth: the coldest, the purest, the only true myth” 
(ibid).  
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William Wordsworth’s sonnet, “The world is too much with us,” seems attuned to 
concern in characteristically Romantic terms, ultimately positing a nostalgic return to 
classicism as a pleasant but unrealistic solution to the fact that humanity no longer 
delights in the natural world:  
          The world is too much with us; late and soon, 
          Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers: 
          Little we see in Nature that is ours; 
          We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! 
          The Sea that bares her bosom to the moon; 
          The winds that will be howling at all hours, 
          And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers; 
          For this, for everything, we are out of tune; 
          It moves us not.—Great God! I'd rather be 
          A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;  
          So might I, standing on this pleasant lea, 
          Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn; 
          Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea; 
          Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn. (Wordsworth 1-16) 
 
The rhetoric of Wordsworth’s sonnet resembles the language of Bataille’s general 
economy in its emphasis on getting and spending, giving and gathering. In “getting” 
(presumably money) and “spending” (not to squander for its own sake, but to acquire 
more material possessions), we paradoxically “lay waste our powers” and “give our 
hearts away”—the profits of what Bataille understands as the short-sighted, “restricted” 
economy are “a sordid boon”. 
The notion that a set of beliefs is rendered more appealing in its disappearance is 
adopted in the self-consciously Pindaric odes of Shelley’s contemporary, the German 
Romantic Friedrich Holderlin, who descended into insanity while attempting to translate 
Pindar’s verse into German.6 In his ode Patmos, which Hamilton connects to Pindar’s 
“Olympian 3”, Holderlin takes the crucified Christ as his object of address, merging 
                                                 
6 The fact that Holderlin’s madness developed while he produced a direct translation of Pindar is 
eerily reminiscent of Cowley’s insistence that “If a man should undertake to translate Pindar word 
for word, it would be thought that one mad man had translated another.” 
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Pindaric thought, Christian doctrine, and a Romanticism reminiscent of Shelley’s odes in 
the declaration that the Son of God most fully achieves divinity in his absence. Fitzgerald 
observes that “Holderlin’s ‘Patmos’ centers on the death of Christ, which introduces the 
era of the gods’ absence in which it is the poet’s task to prepare the conditions for their 
return; Christ’s death is described as the extinguishing of the sun…” (Fitzgerald 48). The 
“fragment of a revised version of ‘Patmos’” (49) recalls Shelley’s treatment of the ruins 
of Pompeii in “Ode to Naples,” as the “‘Island of light’ is described as ‘More athletic/In 
ruin’… when ‘kingdoms, the youthful land of eyes, are perished’…Here…the Athletic is 
a stage of development in the relation between god and human marked by the loss of 
immediate experience…” (ibid). 
For similar reasons, Shelley’s subjects of address in his odes (and other poems 
that center on apostrophe) are defined by their absence, emptiness, ruination, invisibility, 
or abstraction—the West Wind, liberty, a monument ravaged by time, a heaven without a 
god, the ravine of Mont Blanc, intellectual beauty, the ruins of Pompeii, a skylark that is 
a spirit, not a bird. With the advent of an immanent God, the absent becomes the sacred, 
granting us an oblivious dissolution of self. In the words of one of Shelley’s many short 
poems (“To ----”) addressed to an anonymous, wholly indefinite lover, our striving 
becomes understood as “The desire of the moth for the star,/Of the night for the 
morrow,/The devotion to something afar/From the sphere of our sorrow” (To ---- 13-16). 
Shelley’s choice of the specific words “desire” and “afar” imply an absence and a 
separation—desire cannot survive its own fulfillment, and the likelihood of ever 
achieving a removal from “the sphere of our sorrow” is highly uncertain.  
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Yet even while acknowledging this (often explicitly, as in “Ode to the West 
Wind”), the subject of Shelley’s odes and poems of address consistently posits an absent 
object as the means of liberation from “the sphere of our sorrow.” By sacrificing our 
narrow sense of self to something far greater than ourselves, we are released from the 
burden of self-knowledge; the means by which the subject objectifies itself. Significantly, 
the beginning of this poem—“One word is too often profaned/For me to profane it” (1-
2)—suggests a current situation which is defined by the common frequency (“often”) of 
its objectifying profanation and is therefore doubly removed from the sacred. If the 
solution Shelley moves towards by the end of the poem is liberation from the everyday 
order of things, this implies a necessary motion towards the opposite of the standardized 
profane: the sacred, or that which makes us without being made by us. The logic of 
Shelley’s odes seems to insist that although it is both inevitable and commendable for us 
to strive towards a thing that is greater than we are, only a thing that does not exist 
permits us to believe there could be something outside (greater than) an order that seeks 
to define us as yet another thing. Understanding these distinctions may help us explicate 
the apparent contradiction between Shelley’s atheism and categorization as a 
“transcendental” poet. 
Shelley’s most explicit treatment of such ideas is developed in his self-
consciously Pindaric “Ode to Heaven,” which reveals its influence most overtly in its 
application of one of Pindar’s most famous phrases (“the shadow of a dream”) to the 
notion of heaven, which is described as: “But the portal of the grave,/Where a world of 
new delights/Will make thy best glories seem/But a dim and noonday gleam/From the 
shadow of a dream!”(Ode to Heaven 32-36). This ode’s tripartite structure is not as 
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formal as the structure of “Ode to Naples,” but its chorus of spirits seems to be modeled 
after the Greek chorus that recited Pindaric ode. In “Ode to Heaven,” the first spirit 
(strophe) portrays an idealized conception of heaven that corresponds to Christian 
doctrine much more closely than almost all of Shelley’s works; the second spirit 
(antistrophe) refutes such exalted notions, bringing heaven down to the level of earth and 
the human mind which invented it; and the third spirit (epode) concludes and summarizes 
the ode.  
The first spirit maintains that heaven is defined not only by its holiness (“Palace-
roof of cloudless nights!/Paradise of golden lights!” (1-2)) but by its timeless presence 
(“Which art now, and which wert then/Of the Present and the Past,/Of the eternal Where 
and When,/Presence-chamber, temple, home,/Ever-canopying dome,/Of acts and ages yet 
to come!” (4-9)), concluding his section of the poem with the assertion that “Thou 
remainest such—always!”(27). However, while the first spirit believes that heaven is “the 
abode/Of that Power which is the glass/Wherein man his nature sees” (20-22), the second 
spirit determines that “Thou art but the mind’s first chamber,/Round which its young 
fancies clamber,/Like weak insects in a cave…” (28-30). The suggestion that heaven is 
not the lofty and illuminating abode of the most high but rather the murky refuge of 
immature forms inverts the Neoplatonic conception of the Christian god as the form of 
forms, associating heaven with Plato’s cave and Shelley with the enlightened man who 
escapes it.  
Even in the section of the poem that is given to the first spirit, individual gods are 
described as “unremaining” (25), implying that the heaven that “remainest such always” 
remains without a stable center. Ultimately, heaven is also defined by its absence—it is 
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not only “the shadow of a dream,” it is an insubstantial “globe of dew” (46) where 
“Constellated suns unshaken,/Orbits measureless, are furled/In that frail and fading 
sphere,/With ten millions gathered there,/To tremble, gleam, and disappear” (50-54). 
Here, the infinity of existence is consumed by an unreal heaven at the moment of death or 
dissolution, extending its absence to the objects that disappear into it. Still, we are given 
the sense that even this disappearance cannot grant an escape from the systemized 
universe that binds the subject—the “frail and fading sphere” of heaven may be 
synonymous with “the sphere of our sorrow.” In other poems, Shelley posits the absence 
of the object as a means for unveiling an external or transcendent space where humanity 
can enjoy some indefinite experience that does not merely objectify. In “Ode to Heaven,” 
however, absence seems to function as a negative negative, not a positive one—heaven is 
presented as a fiction or abstraction not because it provides a release from the material 
order of things but because the notion that it exists is a deceit; a construction of or 
foundation for the totalized system Shelley rejects. This may explain why “Ode to 
Heaven” lacks the excessive, outpouring quality of “Ode to Naples” and “Ode to the 
West Wind”: this is the repudiation of a force that obstructs any potential for a truly 
divine joy, not an expression of the joy itself.   
Many of Shelley’s shorter poems also seem to follow the general pattern of 
Shelley’s odes—their main object of address is conspicuously absent. Shelley’s 
confrontation with the sublime Power of the titular mountain in “Mont Blanc” is 
characterized most notably by two negative spaces. The reader is first compelled to 
confront the “Dizzy Ravine” (Mont Blanc 34) of Arve: “when I gaze on thee/I seem as in 
a trance sublime and strange/To muse on my own separate fantasy,/My own, my human 
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mind, which passively/Now renders and receives fast influencings,/Holding an 
unremitting interchange/With the clear universe of things around” (34-40). This passage 
is often interpreted as a profound allegory: the river running through the Ravine 
represents the narrator’s fluid, effectual mind and the Ravine represents the external, 
objective world, which shapes and is shaped by (“renders and receives”) the mind. 
However, I would like to suggest something close to the opposite of this reading—after 
all, it is the Ravine, not the river, which leads the narrator to “muse” on his “human 
mind,” which is characterized here by its passivity in its “interchange” with the powerful 
torrents that flow through it. The fact that both readings may seem plausible highlights 
the ambiguity of the passage, which has several effects. The river could represent the 
mind, the objective world, or a divine stream of energy that (like the gods in Pindar) 
makes the mind (or Ravine) more than nothing when the river passes through it. This 
ambiguity also renders both the human mind and the sacred power that shapes it 
undefined and therefore unknowable. All we can ultimately know is that “Power dwells 
apart in its tranquility,/Remote, serene, and inaccessible” (96-97).    
The second negative space of Mont Blanc is “the still cave of the witch Poesy” 
(44) where this Ravine seeks “among the shadows that pass by/Ghosts of all things that 
are, some shade of thee,/Some phantom, some faint image; till the breast/From which 
they fled recalls them, thou art there!” (45-48). Here, Shelley gives us a series of 
indefinite and explicit absences (“some phantom, some faint image”) and one ostensible 
presence (“thou art there”) that is left indefinite, inscrutable, and wholly inaccessible. 
This mystery obliges the curious reader to look back fifteen lines to determine that “thou” 
refers to the Ravine, but the discovery does not exactly clarify matters. The speaker 
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jumps from this passage to the suggestion that there is something privileged about an 
absence from the physical world: “Some say that dreams of a remoter world/Visit the 
soul in sleep, that death is slumber,/And that its shapes the busy thoughts outnumber/Of 
those who wake and live” (49-52). If we cannot glean any overarching meaning from 
“Mont Blanc,” it may be by design. The poem presents its audience with the uncertain 
significance of an underlying force that we can only conclude is important but 
incalculable. Such refusal to be fully understood instills the poem with the forbidding 
quality of its object of address, and challenges its readers to question how we are 
supposed to analyze the material world if we cannot approach the informing principle; 
the “secret strength of things/Which governs thought”(139-140).  
Shelley ends the poem with an appropriately ambiguous and unresolved question 
on the relationship between the mind, the external world, and absence: “And what were 
thou [presumably Mont Blanc], and earth, and stars, and sea,/If to the human mind’s 
imaginings/Silence and solitude were vacancy?” (142-144). The tone of this remarkable 
ending seems impossible to discern, as it reads like a rhetorical question without 
supplying a clear judgment. The absolute meaning of Mont Blanc is absent, but this will 
not stop humanity from ascribing symbolic significance in an attempt at mastery; the 
incorporation of the inaccessible into the order of things. Perhaps the main conclusion we 
can draw is that the transcendent Power of Mont Blanc inspires awe in the speaker and 
the reader precisely because it will not permit conclusions to be drawn. As with Pindar, 
Shelley’s obscurity serves a deeper purpose, reminding us that not only do we not know 
everything, our lack of access to absolute truth is not necessarily a bad thing. 
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Unlike “Mont Blanc,” the theme of vacancy is employed as an indisputably 
liberating force in Shelley’s dramatic epic, Prometheus Unbound, as the mysterious, 
abyssal Demogorgon ultimately consumes the tyrannical Zeus and speaks the last lines of 
the poem—“To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;/To forgive wrongs darker than 
death or night;/To defy Power which seems omnipotent;/To love and bear; to hope when 
Hope creates/From its own wreck the things it contemplates;/…This, like thy glory, 
Titan, is to be/Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;/This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, 
and Victory” (Prometheus Unbound 4.570-4.578). Stuart M. Sperry finds a more direct 
connection, however, between the last line of Act 3 and original ending of the poem—
“Pinnacled dim in the intense inane” (3.4.204)—and “Mont Blanc”: “inane” is a 
“substantive which, with its suggestive negative prefix, Shelley seems to have 
deliberately given the climactic place at the original ending of his drama, like ‘vacancy’ 
at the end of ‘Mont Blanc.’ By the word ‘inane’ Shelley sought, of course, to signify the 
formless void of infinite space—a vacancy full, however, of unlimited potentiality” 
(Sperry 116). In other words, it is only the negativity of the abyss that offers an 
alternative to the chartered world the Romantics loathed. The void has the capacity to 
break the chains of despotic, universal law and make anything truly possible.  
In Shelley’s well-known short poem “Ozymandias,” it is the void of time that lays 
waste to the monument of a despotic lawgiver (Ozymandias was the Greek name for the 
Egyptian pharaoh Ramses) who considers his legacy to be universal and eternal. 
Interestingly, the body of the poem’s narration is not supplied by the speaker—after the 
first line, the narrator merely reports what he was told about Ozymandias’ monument by 
a traveler he met in “an antique land” (Ozymandias 1). The effect is a strange telescoping 
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of absence—not only is the narrator absent to the reader, the mysterious traveler is absent 
to the narrator as he writes his account, leaving the reader to sift through layers of 
symbolic signifiers that are missing their original referents. This complex treatment of 
textuality aptly mirrors the traveler’s tale. While “on the pedestal these words appear:/ 
‘My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings;/Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!’” 
(9-11), the promised object of eternal cosmic significance has been utterly ruined: 
“Nothing beside remains. Round the decay/Of that colossal wreck, boundless and 
bare/The lone and level sands stretch far away” (12-14). From a Pindaric perspective, this 
might be considered the inevitable fate of any mortal who would arrogantly declare his 
own autonomy, rendering himself equivalent to the immortal gods. Yet what is most 
striking about this poem is the complete absence of everything except the written word—
the poem itself and the words carved into the pedestal. Shelley subtly implies that even 
“timeless” works of artifice (such as his poem) are subject to temporality, since the 
“lifeless” (7) statue of Ozymandias lies “Half sunk, a shattered visage” (4). In the context 
of “Ozymandias,” this absence is beneficial, as it marks not the absence of life but the 
absence of tyranny.      
“Ode to Naples” presents one of Shelley’s most complex and ambivalent 
articulations of his theme of an absent object of apostrophe. The opening stanza of “Ode 
to Naples” finds the speaker standing among the ruins of Pompeii, connecting the 
potential fate of the apotheosized Naples, which represents a living version of Pompeii, to 
ruination by means of the temporality that defines the speaker of “Ode to the West Wind” 
and the situation of “Ozymandias”. Appropriately, the speaking subject is associated 
solely with Pompeii—never with Naples—in the poem, allowing Pompeii’s implied 
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relation to the immortalized Naples to create the connection between the speaker and 
Naples. The dead city becomes the intermediary between the living city and the living 
subject, perhaps hinting through its absent presence that both are equally subject to 
temporality. In this way, Pompeii may be just as much of an object of address in “Ode to 
Naples” as Naples itself. The syntactical ambiguity of the ode’s opening line—“I stood 
within the city disinterred”—leaves the reader unable to judge whether the excavated city 
has been exhumed from its ruins or the subject has been temporarily unearthed from his 
obscurity through a connection to something ancient and sacred.  
Both interpretations are highly plausible—if the speaker has been freed from the 
ties that ground him to the objectified world, the verticality that follows ensures that he 
has better access to the “oracular thunder” (Ode to Naples 6) that “thrills through those 
roofless halls” (5, my emphasis) until it “penetrates”(6) his “suspended blood”(7, my 
emphasis). In this heightened state, the subject can intuitively feel the voice of the deep 
heart of Earth in all its menace and awe-inspiring Power. The splendor that the speaker 
discovers among the wastes of time raises the moment to the level of the sublime and 
undoes time: “Around me gleamed many a bright sepulchere/Of whose pure beauty, 
Time, as if his pleasure/Were to spare Death, had never made erasure…” (12-14). The 
ode’s second opening epode continues the theme of absence and invisibility, recalling the 
“unseen presence” of “Ode to the West Wind” as “gentle winds”(23) lift the speaker 
above the “horizontal aether” (41) and “the invisible water white as snow” (43). From 
this point of elevation, mysterious “prophesyings” (49) “seize” the speaker, making him a 
vessel or instrument for their expression. These prophecies become the main body (the 
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strophes and antistrophes) of “Ode to Naples”—from a ruin, the highest validation of life 
is born. 
Ultimately, the absence of the object of address in Shelley’s odes may be 
connected to the absence of the speaker created by the intrinsic nature of writing. Jacques 
Derrida’s claim that speech has been historically valorized over writing in western culture 
is highly relevant here—Derrida explains this phenomenon through the observation that 
while speech is a present absence (its objects of reference may only be concepts that exist 
elsewhere, if at all, but its speaker is indisputably present), writing is a double absence 
(its subject and object are inherently unavailable to the reader and are therefore 
represented through symbols). Traditionally, presence is considered the “good” half of 
the dialectic. This distinction is crucial to any discussion of the differences between 
Pinadric ode and Shelley’s odes. Pindar intended his odes to be performed orally by a 
chorus that served an encomiastic function for the present victor, and may be understood 
at least in this respect as doubly present. Conversely, Shelley’s poetry is literary rather 
than oral, and as such seems to anticipate Derrida by calling attention to its own absence. 
If the performances of Pindar’s odes can be described as “living,” Shelley seems to 
regard his own poetry as a sort of seed that has the power to germinate in the mind of 
each living reader. In “Ode to the West Wind,” the West Wind is depicted as “Thou, from 
whose unseen presence the leaves dead/Are driven, like ghosts from an enchanter 
fleeing” (Ode to the West Wind 2-3). The dead leaves of nature may be equivalent to the 
dead leaves of a book of Shelley’s poetry, which are driven into meaning by the 
enchantment of Shelley’s verse. Like the “unseen presence” of the West Wind, literature 
is something of a paradox—an absent presence. 
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Another way to interpret Shelley’s consistent use of vacancy is through the lens of 
the Romantic interest in the sublime through the vast, immeasurable expanse of nature, 
which may be understood as an attempt to find a place that exists beyond the totalization 
of an all-encompassing deity and a perfectly regimented society. Understanding the logic 
of Shelley’s absent objects of address may help us understand his era’s obsession with the 
sublime, as well as the forces it developed in reaction to. If humanity could still live 
under the ontological perspective of Pindaric ode, we might possess some form of 
community that does not objectify its members, and we might not require some abstract 
place of removal or retreat from the ordered world. Unfortunately for Shelley’s time (and 
ours), circumstances have changed. If Romantic poetry still appeals to us, it may be 
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